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We analyze the role played by Export Credit Guarantees (ECGs) to en-
courage exports to developing countries. The existence of moral hazard on
the side of the …rm is introduced. We show that the inability of the exporter’s
government to verify the actual quality of the product will limit its ability
to encourage trade through ECGs, once the coverage provided goes beyond a
certain threshold. This result provides a rationale behind the limited coverage
on ECGs.
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In order to protect themselves from a the risk of payment default, exporter …rms
can take what is called an Export Credit Guarantee (ECG). This service is o¤ered
by Export Credit Agencies (ECAs), which are usually supported or owned by the
domestic government. In the U.K., this service is provided by the Export Credits
Guarantee Department (ECGD). The ECGD mission statement claims that its ob-
jective is "to bene…t the UK economy by helping exporters of UK goods and services
win business and UK …rms to invest overseas, by providing guarantees, insurance
and reinsurance against loss, taking into account the Government international poli-
cies" (www.ecgd.gov.uk).
Subject to examination of each case, the ECGD pays claims against its guar-
antees and insurance policies where there is a default by the buyer, borrower or
guarantor. The ECGD provides cover for both commercial and political risk. Com-
mercial risks include the possibility of insolvency of the purchaser and failure to meet
contractual obligations. Political risks include actions on the part of the exporter
government (introduction of export licensing and embargoes that would mainly ap-
ply to defence) and at the importer end of the deal, restrictions on the transfer of
money due under the contract, moratorium on external debt and other actions or
events that a¤ect contract performance.
A number of ECGD instruments are used to provide cover for export credits.
Most transactions are …nanced through Buyer Credits or Supplier Credit Finance
Facilities, where the exporter is paid by a bank in the UK and the UK bank o¤ers
credit to the overseas buyer, which could be as much as 100% of the value of the
contract. For these transactions, ECGD o¤ers an export credit guarantee which
di¤ers from a typical insurance policy in that it provides unconditional cover for
non-payment regardless of the cause for non payment. Although the percentage
cover varies with the importer country, there is no established system, as far as we
are aware, that makes coverage change with the nature of the product that is being
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exported1.
Also, some ECAs may require some exporter …rms to sign a right of recourse
clause as part of the insurance agreement. In the case of the ECGD, this clause
gives them the right to recover from an exporter all or part of any claims payment if
it is proved that the exporter has failed to meet any of the conditions of its contract
with the overseas buyer. However, the ECGD always sets a limit on the amount
for which the …rm may be liable, which is generally set at 10%. In addition, the
…rm will be freed from the recourse obligations once the ECGD is satis…ed that a
contract has been completed to an agreed standard. Interestingly, even when the
buyer is unwilling to provide an unconditional certi…cate or statement of satisfaction
that the contract has been met, a decision to release the seller can be taken, and
will be based primarily on the seller’s certi…cation of the ful…lment of its contractual
obligations that proves to the satisfaction of the ECGD.
Over 50 countries have ECAs that provide similar products to EXIG. All ECAs
are required to meet the WTO objective to break even in the long term. Although
in heavy losses during the past 20 years, the ECGD seems to be reaching break-even
point following a more rigorous …nancial objective introduced in 1991 by the gov-
ernment, probably reinforced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) prohibition.
However, Estrin et al. (2000) argue that there is still an implicit subsidy by the
government based on the fact that there is no provision for making a rate of return
on the notional capital required to meet claims2. It is also interesting to mention
that although ECAs tend not to cover 100% of the contract value, sometimes private
sector insurers become involved in this market by providing cover for contract value
that is not covered by ECA guarantees.
1Other conditions of the insurance contract might the dependent of the type of supplier or good
supplied. For products which might have a potential environmental or human rights impact, most
ECAs require an impact assessment to be made prior to the agreement to provide a credit or cover.
2Dewit (2000) provides an analysis of how EXIGs can actually be used as strategic trade poli-
cies. However, recent international agreements like the Arrangement on Guidelines for O¢cially
Supported Export Credits set benchmarks under which premiums cannot be set, therefore limiting
the scope for countries to subsidize …rms by lowering premiums.
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Table 1 shows the maximum percentage insurance coverage of several ECAs. As
can be seen, coverage is usually below 100% and lower for commercial risks than for
political risks.
Table 1. Qualitative Comparison of ECA Insurance Cover
(Source: ECGD International Comparison Survey, October 2002)
Country/ECA Maximum percentage cover
ECA (Country) Political risk Commercial risk
CESDE (Spain) 99 94
COFACE (France) 90 85/90
ECGD (UK) 95 95
EDC (Canada) 90 90
EKN (Sweden) 100 90
EXIM BANK (USA) 100 100
GERLING NCM (Netherlands) 95 95
HERMES (Germany) 95 85
NEXI (Japan) 97.5 90
SACE (Italy) 95 95
One might think of subsidized premium and good coverage for an exporter …rm
as a direct encouragement to trade. In fact, in a recent report3 the ECGD refers to
the degree of coverage as a sign on competitiveness relative to other ECAs. However,
in this paper we will argue that higher insurance coverage does not always encour-
age trade. The presence of asymmetric information between the di¤erent parties
involved in a trade agreement covered by and EXIG can make the ECGD’s task of
increasing the scope for trade with developing nations more demanding. In order
to analyze the existence of asymmetric information, we need to assess both political
and commercial risk involved in exports to developing nations.
A possible source of asymmetric information would be that the exporter …rm
could take an action, not observable to the ECGD, which a¤ects the probability
3ECGD (2003) Report on the Comparison of Export Credit Agencies.
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of default. Estrin et al. (2000) argue that it is di¢cult to think of situations in
which the …rm is more aware about political risk in the importer country than its
own government. However, they also recognize that there is more chance for the
existence of asymmetry in the knowledge of commercial risks. As the cover that
ECAs give is generally less than 100%, this seems to re‡ect that if total cover was
o¤ered, there would be little incentive for banks or exporters to properly investigate
the risks associated with a particular project. Also, the exporting company could
take actions that would result in non-payment. Estrin et al. (2000) do not mention
quality as one of such possible causes for non-payment, they only mention “non-
delivery of the product” and state that such actions would be directly observable
by the insurance company and therefore not a moral hazard problem. However,
they claim that EXIGs can serve as an important device for signalling con…dence in
the exporter by the importing government. This signal concerns the quality of the
ECGD’s backed bid and the idea is that if the …rm was likely to fail to deliver on
quality, the government would not want to cover it since poor quality, if discovered,
may lead to payment default. The crucial assumption here is that the exporter’s
government is more informed than the importing government about the quality
of the product or service to be exported. However, this is not always the case,
especially when the …rm is going to develop a speci…c procurement project in which
the importer government in the only targeted client. Such a project would have the
characteristics of a good whose quality is not be easily veri…able prior or even after
project delivery either by the buyer itself or any external parties.
The objective of our paper is to study the impact of ECGs on trade in the
presence of asymmetric information in the form of private action by the …rm a¤ecting
the quality of the good, not shared by either the exporting or importing countries’
government. We study the impact of such asymmetric information over the ability
of the ECGD to encourage exports to developing nations. Our paper suggests that
importers should monitor closely the ECGs provided by the exporter government to
its domestic …rm as it could be a good method to identify the likelihood of quality
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cheating on the exporter’s side. Given this, the importer will only sign a delivery
contract with the exporter if the expected pro…ts of delivering high quality for the
…rm are higher than those of delivering low quality4. As a result, trade will not
occur if the incentive compatibility constraint that induces the …rm to select the
high level of quality does not hold in the insurance contract between the …rm and
the ECGD. The ECA will then play a crucial role in helping or preventing trade.
We show that a minimum coverage is needed in order to encourage a risk averse
…rm to export to a country which might default payment due to political reasons;
however, excessive coverage needs to be avoided in order to give incentives to the
…rm to invest in high quality and therefore, the commitment power to convince the
importer government that it is safe to sign an imports agreement with that …rm.
The problem we study shares some similarities with La¤ont (1995). That paper
analyzes the design of an optimal contract that would provide incentives for a …rm to
both behave e¢ciently and invest in “safety care”, which decreases the probability
of an environmental disaster. In La¤ont (1995), a su¢ciently high punishment to
the …rm if environmental disaster happens is enough to ensure investment in safety
care.
In our model, the importer government cannot verify the quality that the …rm
is selling prior to the contract being signed. Real quality can only be discovered
with a certain probability once the product is delivered. As in La¤ont (1995), an
importer government should also design a contract providing incentives to the …rm
so to select the high level of quality. The …rm failing to deliver such quality would
face punishment if found out. However, there are a few reasons why this may not
be possible in our case. The …rst is that the exporting …rm may enjoy limited
liability with respect to the developing country. In other words, it may be quite
di¢cult to impose a …ne on a …rm based on a foreign (more developed) country.
Second, quality is di¢cult to verify in a contract. An importer country may have
incentives to always claim that low quality was delivered in order to avoid payment
4This type of behavior on the side of the consumer has also been analyzed in the warranties
literature, see e.g. Lutz and Padmanabhan (1998).
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or reputation loss, even if the reason for not wanting the good is a “change of heart”,
which we will interpret as political default. It is likely to be di¢cult to verify the real
reason for payment default in international courts, which again make punishment
implementation di¢cult, even if the importer discovers that the …rm cheated on
quality.
In this paper, we introduce the ECGD as the principal in a game in which the
…rm’s client is a foreign country. The ECGD will have an interest in ensuring that
the …rm does not cheat on the quality. The reason for this interest though will not
be altruistic, but based on domestic pro…t maximization5. Not ensuring incentives
for investing in quality will result in no trade. The importer government will be
aware of the terms of the export credit guarantee when it decides on whether or not
to import a good and these terms will, in turn, show whether the …rm has enough
incentives to produce the promised quality. Therefore, the ECGD will play a crucial
role in aiding or preventing trade through the ‘signal’ it gives about the quality the
…rm will deliver.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic char-
acteristics of our insurance game, setting out the model, the sequence of moves and
the features of the optimal incentive compatible and individually rational contract
between the …rm and the ECA. It then analyzes the impact of insurance on the
scope for trade. Finally, Section 3 provides conclusions and discusses future lines
for research.
5The need to ensure a good quality of the imports to developing countries is highlighted in
the barter/countertrade literature. Marin and Schnitzer (1998) suggest an economic rationale
for counter-trade agreements is that they address a double moral hazard problem: the exporting
country may deliver high or low quality goods, with quality not being immediately observed, and
the importer country cannot pay up front, owing to liquidity constraints, and may then choose to
default (see also Marin and Schnitzer (2002)).
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2 The Insurance Game
2.1 The model
A monopoly in country  exports a single product/project to country . Since our
focus is on the moral hazard problem in country A, for simplicity we assume that
country  is risk-neutral with valuation of the product given by
 =  ¡  (1)
where  is the quality of the product to be imported,  is the agreed price to be paid
to the exporter and  represents the willingness to pay for quality.
The …rm in country , …rm , producing a good of quality  incurs a cost  ()
with  (0) = 0. Assuming that pure production costs are  and, for the moment,
that the …rm receives the full payment, , the pro…t of the …rm is given by
 = () = ¡ ¡ () (2)
We will later allow for the …rm to be risk averse, in which case, for convenience, we
assume a separable utility function  = (¡ )¡ () where  0  0 and  00  0.
If the …rm is risk neutral,  = 
As in Marin and Schnitzer (1998), we assume that country  faces a …nancial
(credit) constraint and does not pay the agreed price for the good until after this
product is delivered. This is due to the cash constraints in country , which we think
of as a developing country. We also assume that this product is an experience good
whose quality cannot be veri…ed until the product is used/tested by the imported
government.
Country  defaults on the agreed price  if and only if it receives no bene…t from
the good. This can come about for two reasons:
² With probability  there is a change in preferences re‡ected in  becoming 0.
We assume then that  = ¹ with probability 1¡ .
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² If  = 0 and if with probability  the importer country will discover the true
quality of the imported good.
We assume that the above are two independent events. As quality cannot be
veri…ed in international courts, in either of the two above situations, once the product
is received, the importer government has to decide whether to pay the agreed price
anyway or incur in default cost , the maximum payment that can be enforced. We
do not allow for the importer government to use and not pay for a product if none of
the events above have happened. The use of the product is observed as a sign of the
above events not having happened. Implicitly, we are assuming that the developing
country would have a high reputation loss (e.g., through the imposition of a higher
risk premium by …nancial markets) if it decided to do that. Clearly, there will be
no incentive to default if  ¸ ; therefore, in order to create a default possibility we
assume that   . The sequence of moves is as follows:
First, the …rm in country  agrees a price    with country .
Second, the …rm delivers a high quality good ( = ¹) or a low quality good
( = 0).
Third, the preferences of country  are realized:  = 0 with probability  and
 = ¹ with probability 1¡ .
Fourth, if  = 0, the imported good is not used and country  defaults incurring
a cost  transferred to …rm . If  = ¹ country  tests the quality of the good.
Fifth, with probability  country  discovers the true quality of the good. If it
turns out to be low, the good is not used and default occurs. If it turns out to be
high, the good is used and a full payment is made. With probability 1¡  country
 does not discover the true quality of the good. Then the good is used and full
payment is made.
Figure 1 sets out the game tree from event 2 onwards. Using this tree we can
immediately write down the following conditional expected pro…ts of the exporting
…rm and conditional expected utilities of the importing country.
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[ j  = 0] = [(1¡ ) + ]( ¡ ) + (1¡ )(1¡ )(¡ ) (3)
[ j  = ¹] = (1¡ )+  ¡ ¡ (¹) (4)
 [ j  = 0] = ¡ [(1¡ )  + ]  ¡ (1¡ ) (1¡ )  (5)





2.2 Incentive compatibility and participation constraints
There are three conditions for a price to be agreed and trade to take place. The …rst
is an incentive compatibility condition for …rm  that ensures the production of a
high quality good. Otherwise if the importer government believed that the …rm is
lying about the quality it would obviously not import the good (this could change
if minimum quality is not zero) and no trade will take place. The condition is:
IC : [ j  = ¹]  [ j  = 0] (7)
The constraint above says that the …rm will tell the truth as long as the expected
utility when lying is lower than the one from producing the promised quality. If the
exporter government could observe quality or ª(¹) (an indirect way of observing
quality), it would be optimal for the exporter country’s government to implement a
punishment system that ensured that the incentive compatibility constraint of the
…rm was ful…lled in order to allow trade. For the moment, we assume that this is
not the case and that the exporter government can only observe the occurrence of
payment or default. Given that IC holds and so quality  = ¹ is produced, the
two remaining conditions are the participation constraints that state that trade is
Pareto-improving. That is:
PC : [ j  = ¹] ¸  (0) (8)
PC : [ j  = ¹] ¸ 0 (9)
From PC it follows that the maximum price country  is willing to pay is such
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¡  = 0.




Thus, the maximum price is an increasing function of the valuation of high quality,
¹¹, and a decreasing function of the probability of default,  and the minimum
enforceable payment,  in the event of not using the good.
The minimum price at which country  is willing to trade must satisfy both
the  and the  constraints. Suppose …rst that the …rm in country  is risk-
neutral. We then have that  =  up to an a¢ne transformation. The minimum
price that satis…es the  is such that [ j  = ¹] = [ j  = 0]. Using (3)
and (4), the minimum price satis…es (1¡ )(¡ ) = (¹) giving




For the risk-neutral case, the minimum price must also satisfy the  constraint:
(1¡ )(¡ ¡ (¹)) + ( ¡ ¡ (¹)) = 0
i.e., at a price given by




Then the negotiated price must lie between the range
max[   ] ·  · ¹ (13)
We can now distinguish between two equilibria: equilibrium II, for which   
and only the incentive compatibility constraint can bind for …rm , and equilibrium
I, for which    and only the participation constraint can bind for …rm .
From (11) and (12), equilibrium II happens i¤













, then (14) always holds and we only have type II






, then there exists a threshold ¤ 2 (0 1) for
which if  2 [0 ¤) we have a type II equilibrium, whilst for  2 (¤ 1] we have a
type I equilibrium. Figure 2 illustrates these two cases6.
6These …gures assume that   .
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2.3 Insurance
We now assume that the …rm is risk-averse and seeks insurance cover from the
government in country A. The …rm seeks to cover its potential loss from default equal
to the di¤erence between full payment and the transfer that can be enforced following
default,  ¡ . If the government charges a commercial rate for the insurance, the
premium rate will be equal to the probability of default, . Let  2 [0 1] be
the degree of coverage provided. The …rm then receives a payment (¡ ) +  if
default occurs (with probability ) and full payment  if default does not occur (with
probability 1¡ ). In both cases, it pays a premium of (¡ ). The net revenues
(net of production costs and insurance premium, but excluding the cost of quality)
are given by  = ¡¡(¡) if no default occurs, and  = (1¡)(¡)+¡
if default does occur. Clearly with full coverage ( = 1),  =  = ¡¡(¡),
but, as we shall see, this will generate an unexpected problem: the …rm will then
have an incentive to lie about the quality and, anticipating this, the importer will
not trade. With this notation we now have that:
[ j  = 0] = [(1¡ ) + ]() + (1¡ )(1¡ ) ()
[ j  = ¹] = () + (1¡ ) ()¡ (¹)
The minimum price that satis…es the  now is found from equating these two
expressions; i.e., from:
(1¡ )(()¡ ()) = (¹) (15)
If the …rm is only slightly risk-averse, it will still seek insurance and the  con-
straint then implies (1¡)(¡)(1¡) = (¹) at a value for the price approximated
by7:




From this, we see that insurance would actually increase the minimum price at
which the incentive to provide high quality holds. For the more risk averse …rm the
7This uses  ¡ = ( ¡ )(1¡ ).
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(¡ )( 0() + (1¡ )
0())
(1¡ ) 0()¡ (1¡ ) 0()
(17)








(¡ )( 0() + (1¡ )
0())
(1¡ )[(1¡ ) (¡ )  00() +  0()]
(18)
Since  00()  0, we cannot sign this derivative unambiguously, except at  = 0
where it is positive. But for su¢cient low degree of risk aversion the denominator
will be positive so that again, more coverage increases the price at which  holds.
Insurance also changes the participation constraint of the …rm. With  hold-
ing, the minimum price that satis…es the  constraint is given by
(1¡ )( ()¡ (¹)) + (()¡ (¹)) = (0)





(¡ ) ( 0()¡ 
0())
(1¡ ) 0() +  0()
 0 (19)
since    and 
00  0. Figure 3 illustrates the  constraint (for a su¢ciently
low degree of risk aversion), the  constraint and the  constraint (which
remains unchanged) as coverage  2 [0 1] increases. Let  ¸ 0 and   1 be the
points at which  and  intersect  . Let 
¤ be the point at which  and
 intersect. Then trade occurs with coverage  2 [ ]. In the interval [ 
¤)
there is a type I equilibrium where  binds. In this interval increased insurance
coverage lowers the minimum price at which the …rm is willing to participate and
therefore improves the scope for trade. In the interval (¤ ] there is a type II equi-
librium where  binds. In this interval increased insurance coverage increases the
minimum price at which the …rm is willing to participate and reduces the scope for
trade. We summarise this result in the following proposition:
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Proposition
Let  2 [0 1] be the degree of insurance coverage. Then for  2 [ ¤],
increased coverage improves the scope for trade by reducing the mini-
mum price at which the …rm will participate; however for  2 [¤ ], it
reduces the scope for trade by increasing the minimum price at which
the incentive compatibility constraint is satis…ed. Thus for low coverage
the scope for trade improves, while for high coverage the scope for trade
is reduced. Finally, with full coverage ( = 1), there is no incentive for
the …rm to provide high quality, and trade does not occur.
The intuition for this result goes as follows. The minimum price at which the
…rm is willing to trade is derived from the participation constraint. To satisfy this
constraint, an increase in coverage calls for a decrease in the minimum price since
it increases the expected pro…ts of the …rm. However, at the same time, an increase
in coverage decreases the expected losses that the …rm will su¤er if it delivers low
quality. That decrease will need to be compensated by an increase in the price (if
payment occurs) for the incentive compatibility constraint to still hold. Both e¤ects
must be taken into account to assess the impact of increased coverage on the scope
for trade.
2.4 Comparative statics
In this paper, we have not made any assumptions over the bargaining power of
either exporter or importer when agreeing on a selling price. As already discussed
in the introduction, levels of coverage do not usually depend on individual …rms or
projects, and it is therefore di¢cult to talk about an optimal level of coverage for
our …rm. Still, if the …rm described in the paper had all the bargaining power in the
exports deal and the government could design a coverage targeted to this individual
…rm, the optimal coverage would be  and a price ¹ would be paid. Lower bargaining
power on the side of the exporter and therefore lower export prices,  would decrease
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the optimal level of coverage down to ¤. In this section, we analyze the impact of




 but also on
the interval of all possible trade inducing levels of coverage and therefore, the scope
for trade.
² It can be easily proved that an increase in the minimum enforceable payment
from the buyer will cause an upward shift in the  curve in Figure 3 (for
risk aversion su¢ciently low),






 0 and a decrease in the maximum price the importer country
is willing to pay,
¹

 0 Therefore, an increase in  has an ambiguous impact
on the trade area. However, note that both the minimum and maximum levels
of coverage, ¤ and  are now smaller. Therefore, the increase in  will have
either no impact of a negative impact on the optimal level of coverage. The
intuition is clear: the higher the enforceable payment is, the easier it will be
for …rms to want to participate in the sale, even for lower coverage, in addition,
…rms will also have more incentives to cheat in quality and therefore, a lower
maximum coverage will be required for every level of prices.
² It can also be proved that an increase in the probability that the buyer dis-








= 0 This, together with the fact that
¹

= 0 implies that an
increase in  increases the trade area and therefore the scope for trade, spe-
cially at high levels of coverage. Also, as ¤ and  are now bigger, the increase
in  will have either no impact of a positive impact on the optimal level of
coverage. Here, a higher chance of being discovered acts as an incentive not
to cheat and therefore, higher levels of coverage still induce trade.








 0 This, together with the fact that
¹

 0 implies that an increase
in  decreases the trade area and therefore the scope for trade. The impact
on the optimal level of coverage is uncertain, although for high initial levels of
coverage the e¤ect will be negative; a higher probability of default discourages
participation and therefore requires higher levels of coverage to ensure it but,
it also strengthens the incentives to cheat and thus therefore, reduces the
required quality-inducing coverage.
² A reduction in ¹ will only (negatively) a¤ect ¹ reducing the scope for trade,





a¤ecting ¤ and therefore having none or negative impact on the optimal level
of coverage.
² In addition to the results obtained above, it would be straightforward to allow
for a right of recourse within our model. Assume that 1 ¡  represents the
probability of a right of recourse being awarded, that  = 0 and that the …rm
receives no compensation. We also assume that recourse can only be activated
with any success probability if the buyer discovers that the quality is low,
which happens with probability . Note that the existence of a probability of
successful recourse would only a¤ect the incentive compatibility constraint in
the following way8:
(1¡ ) [ ()¡  ()] + (1¡ ) (1¡ ) ()¡ (¹) = 0 (IC recourse)
It can be easily checked that


 0 Clearly, an increase in the probability
of recourse (decrease in ), increases the scope for trade, shifting the IC downwards
8Note that in this case
[ j  = 0] = [(1¡ ) + ]() + (1¡ )(1¡ )()¡ (1¡ ) (1¡ )  (20)
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in Figure 3. Therefore, the decrease in  will have either no impact or a positive
impact on the optimal level of coverage.
The above analysis helps us identify which would be the type of goods whose
trade would be negatively a¤ected by uniform high coverage rates. These will be
likely to be experience or merit goods, as trade deals in such goods would tend to
be characterized by lower  (probability that the buyer discovers the true quality),
higher  (chance the buyer changes his mind with respect to whether he still wants
the delivered goods) and probably higher  (lower probability of successful recourse).
An insurance system with high coverage would leave these goods outside the trading
triangle in Figure 3.
Interestingly, experience goods which are not highly valued by importers (low ¹)
may be even more negatively a¤ected by uniform high coverage.
There is an obvious policy conclusion to our analysis: if the aim of the ECGD
is to promote trade, then coverage should not be homogenous across projects. It is
true that the recourse deal is a way to encourage high quality trade and therefore,
trade ‡ows, but only if there is a high enough probability of verifying the project’s
quality in court. It is also clear from our analysis that an increase in the probability
of accurately verifying quality by either the buyer or the courts will increase the
scope for trade. It is then important to improve the systems that may help verify
both in courts and by the buyer the real quality of the purchased good.
3 Conclusions
Export Credit Agencies are agencies supported or owned by developed countries
whose aim is to help domestic exporters to export their goods to, or invest in,
developing countries, often alongside o¤set agreements. They provide guarantees,
insurance and reinsurance against loss due to failed contract or payment default,
taking into account the government international policies.
In our paper, we claim that contract frustration or non-payment can arise for
two di¤erent reasons: political default owing to a change in the priorities of the
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importer government or commercial default owing to the importer country being
unhappy with the quality of the product, once this is delivered. In deciding whether
to import or not a product a government must assess the incentives that the …rm
has to produce a high quality good. We discuss that, in this assessment, it will be
crucial to observe the terms of the contract provided by the ECA to the domestic
…rm. This provides an additional tool for ensuring that high quality products are
delivered to developing countries.
Our results suggest that an ECGs can improve the scope for trade by encouraging
risk averse …rms to trade with countries which might engage in political default but,
it may also reduce the scope for trade by increasing the incentive of …rms to export
low quality. This suggests that an excessive level of coverage will have a negative
impact on trade. The reason being that high level of coverage will decrease the
expected losses of the …rm if it decided to deliver low quality and therefore, it will
discourage the importer country from signing an exports deal with the …rm.
Our paper is specially relevant to goods or projects covered by an ECA whose
quality is not easily veri…able prior or even after project delivery. A standard high
degree of coverage might make it di¢cult to ensure that the …rm has su¢cient
incentive to deliver. Such risk will be lower for exporters supplying goods on which
they have a track record or whether the technology which is being exported is
well established, the technical expertise of the buyer is also important in assessing
the need and quality of the project. Obviously, tailor made projects rather than
”production-line” projects are at more risk. Our research would call for heterogenous
coverage rates being applied to di¤erent projects, giving lower coverage rates for
”experience good” type projects.
There is a number of ways in which our model could be extended. The ECG
is a sub-optimal mechanism in that the ECGD is constrained to break even. If we
allow the ECGD to extract rent from the …rm, our analysis would get closer to the
optimal mechanisms of La¤ont and Martimort (2002), and we could also explore
the possibility of existence of cost reducing e¤ort on the side of the …rm, therefore,
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getting closer to La¤ont (1995).
A second possible extension of our model would look at the agency relationship
with the ECA acting as an agent of the government in the exporting country, while
still being the principal in the insurance game with the …rm. In this framework, we
might investigate the issue of the ECA being ‘captured’ by the …rm, and thus address
the impact of interest group power over the export credit guarantees and therefore,
over the scope for trade (see e.g., Becker (1983), Fiorina (1985) and La¤ont (2000)).
An additional line of research could look at the possibility that the exporter
government provides incentives to the importer government so that it reveals the
signal that he observes about the quality of the good produced by the …rm. Fol-
lowing Faure-Grimaud et al (2000), we could extend our model so as to address the
possibility that the importer government and the …rm collude at the expense of the
exporting government.
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B   ,P C q q P     
  ,P C q q P     
 0 ,R C R    
 0 ,P C q P     
 0 ,R C R    
  ,R C q R    
Figure 1: The Game Tree
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Figure 3: The Scope for Trade as Coverage Increases
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